On Aug. 21, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) voted 3–2 to publish new guidance on the proxy voting responsibilities of investment advisers under Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act) and Forms N-1A, N-2, N-3 and N-CSR under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the Company Act), as well as interpretation and related guidance regarding the applicability of Rules 14a-1 and 14a-9 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) to proxy voting advice. These new guidelines and interpretation come as a response to the increased criticisms charging that proxy advisory firms make “frequent and significant” errors in their voting recommendations, deviate from their own publicly announced methodologies and maintain inherent conflicts due to being paid by corporate issuers for governance advice.
Investment Advisers’ Proxy Voting Responsibilities
The SEC guidance provides clarification on how an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties and Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act relate to an investment adviser’s proxy voting authority on behalf of clients (whether these clients are individual investors, funds or institutional investors), particularly for investment advisers who retain a proxy advisory firm. The SEC guidance follows a question and answer format and provides practical examples to help facilitate investment advisers’ compliance with their proxy voting responsibilities.
The SEC guidance discusses the following topics:
Applicability of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice Offered by Proxy Advisory Firms
The SEC interpretation and guidance examines when and how an advisory firm’s proxy voting advice constitutes a “solicitation” under the federal proxy rules, thereby subjecting the firm itself to provisions of those rules.
Rule 14a-1(l) under the Exchange Act defines “solicitation” as, among other things, a “communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.” The SEC interpretation states that communications that seek to influence the voting of proxies by shareholders are covered as solicitations, regardless of whether the person making them seeks authorization to act as a proxy and even if that person is indifferent to the vote’s ultimate outcome. Whether a particular communication is a solicitation often turns on “the purpose for which the communication was published – i.e., whether the purpose was to influence the shareholders’ decisions,” as evidenced by the substance of the communication and the circumstances under which it was transmitted. The SEC also notes that “the fact that proxy advisory firms typically provide their recommendations shortly before a shareholder meeting further enhances the likelihood that the recommendations are designed to and will influence the final stages of the investment advisers’ decision-making process on voting determinations,” hence making such recommendations “solicitations.”
However, Rule 14a-2(b) under the Exchange Act provides exemptions from the information and filing requirements of the federal proxy rules, if the Rule’s conditions are satisfied. Subsection (b)(3) specifically addresses “proxy voting advice” and requires that the advice be rendered in the ordinary course of the advisor’s business, without compensation from a person other than the recipients of the advice, not on behalf of a person soliciting proxies or an election participant; and with full disclosure of any significant relationship between the advisor and the issuer or another proponent of a vote or any material interest of the advisor in the outcome.
Finally, the SEC cautions that solicitations that are exempt from the federal proxy rules’ filing requirements remain subject to Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act, which prohibits any solicitation from containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact. As a result, the SEC notes that the proxy voting advisor should consider disclosing the methodology used to formulate advice, including when it deviates from previously-announced methodology; any third-party information sources, and the extent to which such materials were factored into the analysis; and any conflicts of interest the advisory firm has, explained in “reasonably sufficient detail.”
The guidance and interpretation will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
The SEC guidance on investment advisers’ proxy voting responsibilities is available here.
The SEC interpretation and related guidance on the applicability of proxy rules to voting advice is available here.