Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that it is unlawful for an issuer or holder of securities to offer or sell any security except pursuant to a registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), unless a statutorily prescribed exemption is available. The registration process entails preparation of a prospectus, review and comment on the prospectus by the staff of the SEC, and making the prospectus available to investors. State laws also subject the issuance of securities to registration, although in most cases the state laws will be preempted by federal statute. Securities can be issued to accredited investors and other sophisticated investors in private placements, although these securities will be “restricted” — that is, they will not be freely tradeable in the U.S. public securities markets.
In a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the reorganized debtor will almost invariably be issuing new securities to some of its creditors. Without an exemption from registration with the SEC, the reorganized debtor could not issue freely tradeable securities to such creditors, and generally could not issue the securities at all to nonaccredited investors. Complying with the registration requirements, on the other hand, could be time-consuming and distracting, and is never a practicable option.
Enter Section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code. When available, Section 1145 accomplishes two things: It permits the offer and sale of securities under a bankruptcy plan of reorganization to all creditors, including those that are nonaccredited, and it deems those securities to have been issued in a public offering, so that the securities are not restricted and generally can be immediately resold in the public U.S. securities markets by non-affiliates of the reorganized debtor.[1]
The application of Section 1145 is not always straightforward under now-common bankruptcy scenarios that were likely not envisioned when the Bankruptcy Code was adopted in 1978, and in certain cases the exemption of Section 1145 may be unavailable. Sometimes debtors may elect to forgo the availability of Section 1145, notwithstanding that this may disadvantage certain creditor groups. This article reviews the basics of Section 1145, discusses its application to real-world scenarios and addresses reporting and certain other securities law issues applicable to securities issued under a bankruptcy plan.
Section 1145 will be available for securities issued in bankruptcy if:
The availability of Section 1145 most often turns on whether the securities under the plan satisfy the requirement that they be issued in exchange for the prescribed consideration.
A significant majority of large Chapter 11 plans include a rights offering of equity and/or debt securities to creditors as a component of the exit financing. Although the creditors that subscribe to the rights offering are paying cash for the securities they acquire, the staff of the SEC has taken a holistic view that combines the securities issued under the plan in exchange for a creditor’s claims and the securities acquired by the creditor in the rights offering. The staff then looks at the consideration “paid” for these securities in the aggregate, including the value of the claims and the cash paid in the rights offering. If the value of the claims being exchanged exceeds the value of the cash — or according to some practitioners, the value of the cash is no more than 75% of the value of the claims being exchanged — the principally/partly test will be satisfied and the securities issued in the rights offering will also qualify for treatment under Section 1145.
While the cash consideration is easily quantifiable, the value of a claim is not. For starters, the value of a claim is not its face amount, but rather the value ascribed to it in the bankruptcy. There are a number of ways used to estimate the value of a claim:
Assume a plan value of $10 million for the equity of the reorganized debtor, that there is $20 million in face amount of claims against the debtor in the classes that are receiving equity on account of such claims, and that all of the equity is being distributed to such claimants. Under the plan, such claimholders receive 100 shares for each $1,000 in face amount of claims, or 2 million shares in the aggregate. The plan thus ascribes a value of $5 to each share of the reorganized debtor’s stock. Assume further that for each $1,000 in claim amount, a claimholder is entitled to subscribe for 50 shares at $4 per share, with the $1 discount approximating the price of a right. The value of $1,000 in face amount of claims would therefore be (i) $500, based on the value of the shares issued in exchange for the claims, plus (ii) $50, the value of the rights received in the offering based on the discount to plan value, or a total of $550. As the aggregate cash price for the securities acquired in the rights offering is $200 (for each $1,000 in claim amount), the principally/partly test would be comfortably satisfied.
If, however, in the rights offering each holder had the right to subscribe for 200 shares for each $1,000 in claim amount, then the value of the claims per $1,000 in claim amount would be $500 + $200, or $700, while the cash acquisition price in the rights offering would be $800 (for each $1,000 in claim amount). The rights offering would therefore fail the principally/partly test. As a consequence, the shares issued in the rights offering would not qualify for treatment under Section 1145 and the rights offering generally could only be extended to accredited investors or, in some cases, bifurcated into two rights offerings, with one sized to meet the Section 1145 requirements and the remainder “stub” rights offering being subject to private placement restrictions.
There are various common situations in which claimholders may not be able to rely on Section 1145, and, at least in part, the shares they receive under the plan of reorganization may be restricted and hence not freely tradeable.
Instead of a single rights offering for 200 shares per $1,000 face amount of claims, the rights offering is bifurcated. The first offering is for 160 shares per $1,000 face amount of claims. The claim value per $1,000 face amount would then be $500 + $160, or $660, and the cash consideration would be $640 per $1,000 face amount, so that the principally/partly test is satisfied.[7]This rights offering could be made to both accredited and nonaccredited investors. A second rights offering of 40 shares per $1,000 claim amount would be made only to accredited investors.
The exclusion of nonaccredited investors can also be addressed by paying them in cash the value of the rights that they would otherwise have been entitled to receive had they been permitted to participate in the rights offering. Smaller investors are often uninterested in investing new money in a rights offering, and where the rights offering is directed to bondholders or similar investing groups,[8]the number of nonaccredited investors is likely to be relatively small in any event. A solution that pays cash to nonaccredited claimholders, rather than bifurcating the rights offering, may be a superior way (assuming the amount of cash paid does not significantly impair future liquidity) of satisfying both the accredited and nonaccredited claimholder constituencies.
As noted, securities issued pursuant to Section 1145 will be freely transferable upon issuance for purposes of the Securities Act, other than by affiliates of the reorganized debtor.
Some practitioners have observed that the importance of Section 1145 compliance in formulating Chapter 11 plans of reorganization may have waned in recent years for certain fact patterns. More and more, large ad hoc groups of institutional investors, with relatively large collective claims against the debtor, have driven the reorganization process. At the same time, the unsecured creditors committee, representing a sea of smaller, uncoordinated claimholders, has receded from its prior perch of principal importance. The ad hoc groups, often led by one or more outsize creditors that are likely to be affiliates of the reorganized debtor in any event, are less likely to be concerned with the post-emergence liquidity of the smaller creditors, and so the availability of Section 1145 may not loom as large in their thinking about how best to achieve an optimal capital structure for the debtor post-emergence.[20]One consequence of the somewhat diminishing attention paid to Section 1145 in recent bankruptcy cases has been large, non-Section 1145-compliant rights offerings, with a six (or for non-reporting companies, 12)-month holding period for the acquired securities under Rule 144.
Creditors that receive securities under a bankruptcy plan of reorganization should be aware of the application of the federal securities laws, particularly if the debtor emerges as a public company registered with the SEC under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. Section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code will exempt certain issuances of securities received under the plan from the registration requirements of the SEC, with the consequence that these securities will be freely tradeable other than by affiliates of the reorganized debtor. Securities that do not qualify for issuance pursuant to Section 1145 and securities received by affiliates will not be freely tradeable upon emergence. Regardless of whether securities qualify under Section 1145, creditors receiving significant amounts of equity securities under a plan may be obligated to file beneficial ownership reports with the SEC.
It may take time to sort through the issues and related filing requirements, which can involve matters of judgment and coordination between counsel for the creditors and the debtor. Accordingly, it is best practice for creditors, the issuer and counsel to focus on the securities law issues early and regularly during the process.
[1] Section 1145(a) provides the exemption from registration. Section 1145(c) deems securities issued in reliance on Section 1145(a) to have been issued in a public offering.
[2]This condition would not be satisfied in a sale of debtor property under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, in which a subsidiary or assets of the debtor are sold in exchange for stock of the acquiror and the stock is distributed to creditors.
[3]This condition would not be satisfied if creditors receive securities of an affiliate of the debtor that is not itself participating in a joint plan with the debtor in bankruptcy.
[4] Among other things, administrative expenses include wages, salaries and commissions for services rendered to the debtor, fees of professionals employed by the debtor, expenses of a committee or creditor making a substantial contribution to a case, and expenses of an indenture trustee that makes a substantial contribution. Such expenses are not usually paid in the form of securities.
[5]This same value is often used to determine the acquisition price for the securities sold in an equity rights offering, which is typically priced at a discount to plan value.
[6]For example, there could be a number of reasons why the debtor cannot rely on Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act, which exempts exchanges of securities for other securities of the same issuer, subject to certain conditions. Creditors may be required to put in new money, a solicitation agent may be used, the claimholders may be trade creditors that do not hold a security or new securities may have a different issuer from the exchanged securities.
[7]This assumes that a simple majority of claim value is sufficient to satisfy the principally/partly test. As noted in the text, some practitioners recommend a higher percentage of claim value.
[8]If the creditor class includes trade creditors, there could be a meaningful number of nonaccredited investors, so making the rights offering available only to accredited investors may not be appropriate.
[9]In contrast, if the backstop arrangements are made available to all creditors of a class, the securities acquired pursuant to the backstop commitments may qualify under Section 1145, assuming satisfaction of the principally/partly test.
[10]Widely available holdback securities may also be open to a Section 1145 analysis similar to that in the previous note.
[11]If rights are transferable, there will likely be fewer securities available for purchase by the backstopping investors. Whether these investors will advocate for or resist the issuance of transferable rights will depend on their investment thesis for the reorganized debtor and their appetite for acquiring additional securities.
[12]Section 1145(b)(1)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code would seem to indicate that Section 1145 is unavailable for securities issued to affiliates of the reorganized debtor. The SEC staff, however, takes the position that Section 1145 is available but that the securities are “control securities” (not “restricted securities” under Rule 144).
[13]If a creditor is an affiliate of the reorganized debtor on emergence but then ceases to be an affiliate (for example, because it has reduced the size of its holdings), it will be free to sell its shares without restriction under Rule 144 three months after it has shed its affiliate status.
[14]There is a presumption, ensconced in the legislative history of Section 1145, that a holder of more than 10% of the voting equity of the reorganized debtor will be deemed an affiliate. The staff of the SEC, however, has rejected a bright line test and stated that the determination of “affiliate” status for purposes of Section 1145 is to be made in the same manner as for all other purposes of the securities laws. When evaluating whether a 10% holder is an affiliate, practitioners will look to indicia of control, including whether there are other, more substantial holders of the issuer’s equity and whether the investor has other relationships with the issuer, such as the right to board representation, that may be indicative of influence over the management of the issuer.
[15]Rule 13d-3(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prescribes the methodology for including rights to acquire shares in a beneficial ownership calculation. The shares issuable upon exercise of the rights held by the particular investor — but not the rights held by any other investor — are included in both the numerator and the denominator when computing the percentage ownership of the investor. Only rights exercisable within 60 days are included, but inclusion does not depend on whether the rights are “in the money.”
[16]Typically, the issuer will register the resale of shares of the creditors under a shelf registration statement, allowing the creditors to sell their shares from time to time on a delayed basis. Sales can be made either directly into the market, in underwritten offerings or in other ways, all of which are referred to as shelf takedowns. Underwritten offerings involve the time and expense of the issuer, and it is these types of shelf takedowns that the issuer will seek to limit under the terms of the registration rights agreement (as discussed below and referred to there as registered offerings).
[17]See note 15 regarding the beneficial ownership calculation.
[18]This assumes that the reorganized debtor will be registered with the SEC at the time of emergence. The requirements differ if the reorganized debtor registers after the shares have been issued.
[19] Reporting under Section 13(d) and Section 16 entails numerous other details and nuances, which cannot be addressed here.
[20]Under a Section 1145-compliant plan, while affiliated creditors obtain the benefit of the ability to sell immediately in small quantities under Rule 144, this benefit is likely to be marginal to their exit strategy. Their focus will instead be on the terms of their registration rights and their role in the corporate governance of the reorganized debtor.